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ABSTRACT 
Lack of access to credit is a key obstacle for economic development of transitional 
economies such as Kenya. The underlying problem is related to information asymmetry 
combined with the lack of collateral by low income households. Microfinance led group 
lending model offer a new way to deal with this problem without resorting to collateral 
requirements. The core issue in group lending is that it systematically exploits elements of 
social capital that inherently exist in groups into an incentive contract that substitutes 
collateral; a formal bank conventional requirement of lending that is virtually unavailable to 
the poor. This study sought to ascertain the influence of social capital dimensions on 
households’ participation and repayment performance in micro-credit groups in the study 
area. The study was conducted in Moiben Division, Uasin Gishu County, Kenya based on a 
sample of 174 households selected using a multi-stage sampling technique. The data was 
collected using a personally administered structured questionnaire. In the analysis descriptive 
statistics, Heckman two stage and a Tobit regression models were employed. The results 
show that individual and group borrowers had significant differences in gender, age, farm 
size, years of education, income and land tenure. It was established that household size, farm 
income and distance to the nearest financial institution positively influenced a household to 
join micro-credit group. On the other hand age, gender, years of education, farm size and 
interest rate were found to be significant and negatively influenced household decision to join 
micro-credit groups. The level of household participation in micro-credit groups measured by 
the number of loan borrowings was significantly and positively influenced by age, total 
income, years of experience in group borrowing and decision making index while farm size, 
heterogeneity index and density of membership had a negative affect on household number of 
loan borrowings. Lastly, the results on group loan repayment performance using the Tobit 
model revealed that experience in group borrowing, number of visits by loan officer, peer 
pressure, meeting attendance index and heterogeneity index positively and significantly 
influenced loan default rate while gender, household size, distance to the nearest financial 
institution and density of membership were significant but negatively influenced household 
loan repayment performance. The study therefore recommends that MFIs should increase 
awareness and encourage poor households to form micro-credit groups. These institutions are 
obliged to provide training to households on group dynamics in order to take advantage of 
social capital existing within well organized and managed groups. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Access to credit is known to accelerate household and national economic 
development (Pederso, 2003; FAO, 2006). Recent financial access surveys show that access 
to credit is a major problem especially in the rural areas (FSD, 2006 and CBK, 2009). The 
2009 survey showed that 50 percent of the rural individuals had never used any credit service 
compared to 61.7 percent in 2006. In particular the rural households who face limited access 
to credit have volatile and relatively low incomes and majority of them engage in agriculture 
for food, income generation and meeting other household financial obligations (Petrick, 
2002). These households suffer from income shocks due to fluctuations in weather and 
consumption prices aggravated by seasonality in crop production. Such households try to 
smooth income and reduce risk by diversifying economic activities. 
In Kenya, access to credit particularly remains a mirage to a majority of the growing 
population. Combined to those who have access to microfinance institutions (MFIs) and 
Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs), more than half of the adult population 
is excluded from formal bank credit (CBK, 2009). According to FSD (2009) about 60.4 
percent of the Kenyan population do not have access to credit markets. Viewed against a 
growing evidence of rising cost of living, low or no access to credit inhibits both investment 
and consumption smoothing thus accelerating poverty levels. This lack of access to credit by 
poor rural households has negative consequences for agricultural and non-agricultural 
productivity, income generation and household welfare (Diagne and Zeller, 2001). The 
situation threatens the capacity of the poor rural households in their quest for sustainable 
production and enterprise expansion. 
Access to financial resources is constrained by both internal and external factors. 
Internally, small scale households lack creditworthiness and management capacity, hence 
have trouble securing funds for their activities such as procuring raw materials, agricultural 
inputs, farm mechanisation, adoption of improved agricultural technologies and investing in 
plant and equipment. From the external perspective, they are regarded as insecure and costly 
entities to deal with because they lack required collateral and have the capacity to absorb only 
small amount of funds from financial institutions. They are consequently rationed out in their 
access to credit because of high intermediation costs, including the cost of monitoring and 
enforcement of loan contracts.  
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To take care of the financial needs of low income households, a number of 
alternatives institutions to bank credit have emerged. These include MFIs, SACCOs, 
Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs), government, employers, informal 
lenders, buyers of harvest, local shops and family/friends. MFIs particularly have an 
advantage over traditional banks and largely favour Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) since 
they are unable to meet conventional bank criteria such as producing tangible collaterals. 
Instead, MFIs depend on cash-flow based lending, credit scoring, prior lending experience 
with the client and group lending which gives them a competitive edge over conventional 
banks. Despite this the main challenges facing MFIs are lack of credit lines and high cost of 
their credit to potential borrowers. 
This study focuses on the group lending approach which is aimed at providing credit 
to individual members of a micro-credit group. Group lending approach makes use of group 
guarantee mechanism making loans accessible to the low income households who lack 
collaterals (Mejeha and Ifenkwe, 2007). The approach has existed and continue to exist in 
Kenya with the latest being government led women and youth enterpise funds. These were 
designed to improve credit access to women and the youth who tend to be marginalized by 
formal credit markets (RoK, 2006). Group lending approach has led to emergence of MFIs 
that lend through groups to overcome collateral problems (Mosley, 1996; Ouma, 2002). 
Institutions using this model in Kenya include Promotion of Rural Initiatives and 
Development Enterprises Limited (PRIDE), Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT), Faulu 
Kenya, Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (K-Rep), Women Development Company 
(WEDCO), Small and Micro Enterprise Programme (SMEP) among others (RoK, 2006). 
According to (Zeller et al., 2002) and Ghalak (1999) the unique feature of associating 
creditworthiness with membership of a group increases peer pressure for loan repayment 
while membership restrictions provides enough collateral for the financial institutions. 
Similar institutions such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia have 
recorded considerable success in delivering credit to the poor members of the society 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). 
The success of group lending approach in accessing credit and lowering default rates 
relies heavily on social capital (Grootaert, 1999). In group lending approach, microfinance 
institutions extend credit to individuals in a group with greater value attached on organized 
groups depicting the importance of social capital. The MFIs rely heavily on the notion that 
borrowers can utilize their social capital to overcome problems such as adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and contract enforcement associated with asymmetric information in credit 
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markets (Gomez and Santor, 2001). Social capital is defined by Narayan and Woolcock 
(2000) as the intangible norms and networks that enable people to act collectively especially 
in the rural areas. These intangible resources include amount of expectations and obligations 
linked to being member of a group. The underlying dimensions are the characteristics of the 
social relationships of individuals that will shape their set of expectations, obligations and 
finally influence their capacity to coordinate, cooperate and to engage in any form of 
exchange. 
The fundamental function attributed to social capital is the ability of people to group 
together to obtain some collective benefit. These benefits are for the entire group as well as 
captured by individuals within the group (Warren, 2008). Mwangi and Ouma (2012) 
demonstrated that social capital enables people to attach greater value in their groups which 
facilitate collective action. This is because a group is comprised of people who interact 
directly, frequently and in multi-faceted ways (Bowels and Gintis, 2002). Groups lower 
uncertainty and reduce transaction costs thereby fostering economic activity at the micro 
level, while at the same time providing a new analytical tool to explain some macro 
phenomena like rural development differentials. As argued by Pitt and Khandker (1998),  the 
level of attachment, social ties and integration is very high in the rural areas. This could be 
partly explained by the degree of homogeneity in the economic activities that people engage 
in, the family ties as well as the cultural practice. Credit groups enable access to private 
information unavailable to credit markets, monitor members’ behaviour and punish 
individual members who go against the social norms (loan defaulters). According to Mwangi 
and Ouma (2012) sharing information among group members reduces transactions costs, the 
sense of belonging facilitates collective decision making while the solidarity and reciprocity 
that emerge from the networks diminish opportunistic behavior. 
Putnam (1993) demonstrated that social capital has quantifiable effects on different 
aspects of human beings using different proxies. Narayan and Pritchett (1997) developed a 
number of indicators/dimensions related to village associations, activities, norms and trust. 
These indicators include density of membership, group heterogeneity, member cash 
contribution, member labour contribution, meeting attendance and participation in group 
decision making. Existence of these dimensions bind groups of borrowers together as a form 
of social collateral. Any deviation from the norms guiding the group may lead to sanctions or 
exclusion (Mwangi and Ouma, 2012). Accordingly, groups substitute the traditional collateral 
and poor legal frameworks required in enforcing loan contracts, both of which keep them 
away from accessing formal credit. 
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 Majority of the small-scale households in Uasin Gishu County suffer from limited 
access to formal credit due to lack of collaterals. Joining micro-credit groups presents an 
option to increase access to credit and improve loan repayment performance. This is 
exhibited by the proliferation of micro-credit groups all over the County though a number of 
these groups have been dissolved due to loan default (Keror, 2012). For most of them 
belonging to a micro-credit group is thought to boost their credit worthiness and improve 
repayment performance. This study was designed to establish the role of social capital in 
enhancing access to credit and improving repayment performance for households in Uasin 
Gishu County. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
One of the major obstacles facing rural development in the transition economies is the 
limited access to financial capital by the low income households for micro and small business 
and small scale commercial farming. Until the establishment of MFIs, the entrepreneurial 
initiatives of the low income households were hampered since most of them were excluded 
from the formal credit market. As a consequence, they were either not able to be self-
employed, or, if they had started their own businesses they were not able to expand it to a size 
sufficient to generate income above the poverty line. To tackle the this problem new lending 
approaches have been developed and implemented by specialized MFIs. Group lending is one 
such approach that has gained considerable success in increasing low income household 
access to credit and improving loan repayment performance in Kenya. However, while there 
exist a good number of micro-credit groups in Uasin Gishu County, little is known about the 
social capital dimensions that influence household participation in micro-credit groups and 
loan repayment performance. Other factors influencing the decision of households to join 
micro-credit groups need also be understood. It is therefore imperative to explore the 
influence of social capital dimensions on micro-credit groups in the County. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
1.3.1 General Objective 
To assess the influence of social capital dimensions in improving credit access and repayment 
performance in micro-credit groups which contributes to the rural development in  Uasin 
Gishu County. 
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1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
i. To characterize the socio-economic attributes of the micro-credit group and individual 
borrowers in Uasin Gishu County.  
ii. To determine the factors influencing household participation and level of participation 
in micro-credit groups. 
iii. To determine the influence of social capital dimensions, socio-economic and 
institutional factors on household repayment performance under group borrowing 
scheme. 
1.4 Hypotheses 
i. The socio-economic characteristics of micro-credit group borrowers are not 
significantly different from those of individual borrowers.   
ii. Social capital dimensions, socio-economic and institutional factors do not 
significantly influence household participation and level of participation in micro-
credit groups. 
iii. No social capital dimension, socio-economic or institutional factor has a statistically 
significant influence on household repayment performance under group borrowing 
scheme. 
1.5 Justification of the Study 
 Since majority of the small and medium enterpises (SMEs) do not have easy access to 
formal credit due to lack of collaterals, group lending comes in handy through formation of 
micro-credit groups. These groups are strengthened by existence social capital. It is therefore 
vital to conduct an empirical study geared towards analyzing the influence of social capital 
dimensions and other factors that drive small-scale households towards participation in such a 
program to get a better understanding of the program’s effects on household access to credit 
and repayment performance. 
 These group lending schemes are fairly new with many initiated recently, therefore 
there are few studies on the impacts of the strategy on participants’ access to credit and 
repayment performance (Microcredit Summit, 1997). This creates an information gap which 
the study tries to fill especially on the influence of social capital dimensions on household 
participation in micro-credit groups and the effect on repayment performance. The empirical 
findings will serve to guide the policy makers and other stakeholders involved in such 
programs on appropriate interventions to support small-scale households improve their 
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livelihood. The study may also be used by MFIs to assess whether they have achieved their 
objective to increase household access to credit and improve their loan recovery which is key 
in determining sustainability of the program. 
1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study 
 The study was confined to getting information on the influence of social capital 
dimensions on micro-credit groups in Uasin Gishu County. It is a small geographical area of 
the country, hence the results may not apply to others areas. The study mainly focused on the 
influnce social capital dimensions on participation in micro-credit groups and its implications 
on credit repayment performance, therefore setting a boundary for the study.  It is also 
important to mention that social capital is diverse and broad. Given that social capital is broad 
and involves diverse fields, disciplines and area specific, not all issues relating to it were 
explored. In addition illiteracy, lack of proper record keeping by groups and questions on 
social capital may lacked exact answers. 
1.7 Definition of Terms 
Adverse selection- A situation which occurs when a product or service is selected by only a 
certain group of people who offer the worst return for the company.  It occurs in most 
cases because of information asymmetries. 
Asymmetric information- situation in which one party to a transaction has more or better 
information about the transaction than the other. 
Collateral- Something pledged by a borrower to secure a loan or credit, and subject to  
seizure in the event of default, also called security. 
Credit rationing- refers to a measure employed by lending institutions to limit lending based 
on determinations they make about the credit-worthiness of borrowers as well as the 
lending environment in general. 
Group borrowing- a situation whereby individuals form groups with the intention of 
borrowing. In this case, group members are jointly accountable for the repayment in 
the event of default. Therefore, the whole group provide enforcement mechanism as 
group members put pressure on borrowing members to repay their loans. 
Individual borrowing- a situation where individuals borrow directly from the financial 
instituon without forming any group. 
Micro-credit group- a group formed for the purpose of gaining access to credit. It includes 
women groups, youth groups and other self-help groups (SHGs). 
7 
 
Microfinance- the provision of financial services to the poor, low income households usually 
lacking access to formal financial institutions. 
Moral hazard- refers a situation where a party is more willing to take a risk, knowing that 
the potential costs or burdens of taking such risk will be borne, in whole or in part, by 
others. 
Peer pressure- refers to the influence exerted by a peer group in encouraging a person to 
change his or her attitudes, values, or behavior in order to conform to group norms. 
Social capital- defined for this study as the formal and informal linkages of rural inhabitants 
through local organizations/groups in rural areas. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Microfinance Definition 
 Microfinance, according to Otero (1999) refers to the provision of financial services 
to low-income poor and very poor self-employed people. These financial services according 
to Ledgerwood (1999) generally include savings and credit but can also include other 
financial services such as insurance and payment services. Schreiner and Colombet (2001) 
define microfinance as the attempt to improve access to small loans and small deposits for 
poor households neglected by banks. Therefore, microfinance involves the provision of 
financial services such as savings, loans and insurance to poor people living in both urban 
and rural settings who are unable to obtain such services from the formal financial sector.  
2.2 Microfinance and Microcredit 
In the literature, the terms microcredit and microfinance are often used 
interchangeably, but it is important to highlight the difference between them because both 
terms are often confused. According to Sinha (1998) microcredit refers specifically to small 
loans, whereas microfinance refers to a situation where NGOs and MFIs supplement the 
loans with other financial services such as savings and insurance. Therefore microcredit is a 
component of microfinance in that it involves providing credit to the poor, but microfinance 
involves additional non-credit financial services such as savings, insurance, pensions and 
payment services (Okio, 2005).  
2.3 Microfinance Lending Models 
With the evolution of microfinance concept, a number of microfinance lending 
models have evolved over time. The Grameen Bank (2000) has identified eight different 
microfinance models which includes associations, cooperatives, credit unions, individual 
lending, group lending, Grameen model, rotating savings and credit associations and village 
banking. This study focused on the individual lending model and group lending model since 
these are the two main microfinance models prevalent in Kenya. 
2.3.1 Individual Lending Model 
This is a straight forward credit lending model where loans are given directly to the 
individual borrowers. It does not include the formation of groups, or generating peer 
pressures to ensure repayment. In this model MFIs provide loans to individual borrowers 
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based on their own personal credit worthiness, past performance, viability of business 
propositions, client’s income sources and business position. It is more prevalent with clients 
who generally need bigger size loans and have the capacity to produce collaterals. The 
individual approach is commonly associated with commercial banks. 
2.3.2 Group Lending Model 
The group lending model is based on group peer pressure whereby loans are made to 
individuals who must belong to a micro-credit group. Group members collectively guarantee 
loan repayment, and access to subsequent loans is dependent on successful repayment by all 
group members. The model basic philosophy lies on the fact that shortcomings and 
weaknesses of the individual lending are overcome by the collective responsibility and 
security afforded by the formation of a group of such individuals. The collective coming 
together of individual members is used for a number of purposes including education and 
awareness building, collective bargaining power and peer pressure. According to Berenbach 
and Guzman (1994), group lending has proved effective in deterring defaults as evidenced by 
loan repayment rates attained by the Grameen bank in Bangladesh. 
2.4 The Concept of Social Capital and its Measurement 
Social capital is a multidimensional concept that reflects the complex system of 
formal and informal organizations in any society. When examining social capital it is 
necessary to indicate which dimension and level of reference. Community social capital is 
measured through networking activities in a village which reflects the intensity of social 
interactions that reduce, if not suppress, free-riding (Hayami, 2009). The focus in this study is 
on the social capital dimensions of micro-credit groups at the village level, in line with 
empirical studies that use similar measures to investigate relationships between social capital 
and household expenditures (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997). However, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998) offers an alternative typology, distinguishing between the structural, relational and 
cognitive dimensions of social capital. Their emphasis was on the relationship between 
groups and the service providers and less emphasis was on the relationship between group 
members. In the study of Narayan and Pritchett (1997) social capital dimensions include, 
membership heterogeneity, frequency of meetings, member contribution, participation in 
decision making and density of memberships. Stemming from the work of Narayan and 
Pritchett (1997) this study adopts their measurement units of social capital dimensions since 
the present emphasis is on the relationship between micro-credit group borrowers, how it 
affects household access to credit and group loan repayment performance. 
10 
 
 Studies from the Local Level Institutions studies examined social capital and local 
institutions in Bolivia (Grootaert and Narayan, 2000) and Burkina Faso (Grootaert et al., 
2002). These studies were done in an identical manner to the work Grootaert (1999) using the 
five dimensions of social capital as stipulated by Narayan and Pritchett 1997. However, in the 
study of Burkina Faso a sixth dimension community orientation was added, this examined 
whether the organization was instituted by comminuty members or imposed by donors/MFIs. 
In this study, the variable community orientation was dropped since it was found that all the 
groups were started by community members, none was imposed to then by MFIs. 
While social capital is relational, its influence is most profound when relationships are 
among heterogeneous groups. From an economic perspective, studies conducted as part of the 
World Bank’s Local Level Institutions Study (Grootaert and Narayan, 2000) confirm the 
importance of heterogeneity in group membership when using the dimensions adopted from 
Narayan and Pritchett (1997). This pattern of results is also found in rural Tanzania (Narayan 
and Pritchett, 19997), in Indonesia (Grootaert, 1999) and in rural Bolivia (Grootaert and 
Narayan, 2000). It is not simply an issue of the extent to which people are connected to 
others, but the nature of those connections. The heterogeneity variable measured similar to 
the work of Narayan and Pritchett (1997) was also added in this study to find out its influence 
on level of participation in micro-credit groups and group loan repayment performance. In 
contrast to the work of (Grootaert and Narayan, 2000) Cassar et al., 2007 found that group 
homogeneity within groups has a positive effect on group performance specifically their 
results support the idea that group homogeneity is likely to exert a positive influence on loan 
repayment. 
During group scheduled meetings several activities occur including, loan payments, 
group cash contribution, issuing new loans, training in group operations and the importance 
of group solidarity, and monitoring of loan repayment by all members (Karlan, 2006).  
Attending group meetings according to Lasagni and Lollo (2011) raises social capital because 
the repetition of interactions is the funding element of reciprocity among individuals. 
Expectations and obligations will build up and evolve together with interaction. This indicate 
that the higher the frequency of meetings the clearer the set of expectations and obligations 
between group members. In coherence with this finding, Okunmadewa et al. (2007), Yusuf 
(2008) and Lawal et al. (2009) found that households who regularly attend group meetings 
are better positioned to obtain credit than others that do not. This variable was used in this 
study to ascertain its influence on access to credit and loan repayment performance. 
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Prior literature has indicated that the more the number of groups one subscribes to, the 
higher the probability of accessing an informal loan (Mwangi and Ouma, 2012). This is in 
line with the view of Grootaert (1999) and Yusuf (2008), that additional memberships of 
households in associations increases the probability of access to credit at local level 
institutions. Conversely, Balogun and Yusuf (2011) argue that households’ density of 
memberships index decreases the probability of obtaining credit from cooperative, 
governmental agency and friends and family implying that density of membership 
associations alone is not sufficient condition to obtain credit from these sources. This study 
incoporates the variable generated as per Narayan and Pritchett (1997) to establish the 
influence on number of borrowings and the group loan repayment performance. 
It is widely recognized that efficient and equitable groups are those that allow 
participation of members in the decision making processes, as well as the sharing of benefits 
and costs (Tabi, 2009). Where this is possible different segments of the society feel the need 
to pool resources within groups which heightens the effect of social capital. In Indonesia for 
example, participation in group decision making correlates positively with household access 
to credit (Okten and Osili, 2004). Grootaert (1999) in his study noted that an increase in the 
participation would give a higher expenditure level. Similarly, Grootaert and Narayan (2000) 
found that households who actively participate in decision making profit more than others. 
On the other hand Yusuf (2008) found that active participation in decision making actually 
dampens welfare whereby high level of commitment to associations reduces household 
welfare. Using a similar decision making index as generated in the work of Yusuf (2008) this 
study sought to find out whether active participation in decision making had different 
implication on both number of borrowings and group loan repayment performance. 
Cash contribution is common to people participating in economic-related, spiritual 
and environmental related groups. It is hypothesized that groups that demand a larger cash 
contribution from its members will experience good repayment performance since the 
contributions can be used to repay loans in case of default by a member. Notwithstanding this 
large cash requirement may discourage members from joining the group. According to Ajani 
and Tijani (2009) cash contribution to groups or associations by households increases the 
probability of access to credit. On the contrary, Grootaert (1999) study in Indonesia revealed 
negative coefficients of the cash and work contribution variables on household welfare. This 
meant that the poorest households participate more actively in social groups, including 
making larger contributions in cash and in kind. This clearly brings out the importance which 
the poor attach to these organizations. Presumably, the rich have less need to associate in 
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groups. Differing from the work of Grootaert (1999) the present study makes use of cash 
element of contribution and drops out the labour contribution since it was found that micro-
credit groups do not require members to provide labour contribution.  
2.5 Determinants of Households’ Participation and Level of Participation in Micro-
credit Groups 
 A household participates in micro-finance programme, if it actually borrows from that 
source of credit (Diagne and Zeller, 2001). A study on the participation of a rural household 
in Self Help Group (SHG) in Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh using probit model revealed 
that the households’ total income was a significant factor in influencing the probability of 
household participation in SHG (Basu and Srivastava, 2005). Similarly, using Heckman 
selection and double hurdle models, Duy (2012) showed that total income was a critical 
factor that influenced households to join group-based borrowing and the amount of loan 
borrowed. The finding indicated a statistical difference in the total income of individual 
borrowers and group-based borrowers. Total household income which is the sum of off-farm 
and farm income is thus expected to have a positive influence on household to join micro-
credit group and the number of times borrowed. 
 Owour (2009) employed a propensity score matching method to evaluate effects of 
micro-finance credit (MFC) on borrower’s productive performance in Kenya. The findings 
revealed that participation in MFC improved household productive incomes by a range of 
between US$ 200 and US$ 260 in a single production period. Using ordinary regression to 
find out the implication of group lending on poverty levels (Olomola, 2002) found 
participation in group lending to have no influence on poverty levels in Nigeria. A study by  
Kinuthia et al. (2011) evaluated factors influencing participation in tree planting program and 
the extent of participation measured in acreage allocation in Nyeri district, Kenya. They 
employed Heckman two stage sample selection model in analysis to deal with the self 
selection problem. Similarly, to correct selection bias problem, this study employed Heckman 
selection model to determine the social capital dimensions and other factors that influence 
household access to group loans. It is expected that participation in micro-credit group will 
influence household access to credit measured by the numbers of loans. 
 Nguyen (2007) applied Probit model to estimate credit program participation and 
Tobit model to estimate loan amount received. By separating the source of loan, Nguyen 
expected that the determinants of credit participation would be different as the eligible 
requirements for borrowing are different between sources. The findings showed that number 
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of members in a household was found to have a large and significant effect on credit 
participation, especially from formal source. Using a binary logistic regression model (Aqsa 
et al., 2005) found comparable results where household sizehad a positive and significant 
influence on household access to credit and participation in credit program in Pakistan and 
Fadama II group project in Nigeria. These studies suggest that individuals with large 
household size were likely to participate in programmes as they have more family burden to 
contain with, in terms of social and economic services, and therefore need support to meet 
their family daily needs. In contrast Ha (1999) found that household size has a negative effect 
on the probability to borrow as well as on the amount borrowed. This uncertainty of 
household size group participation arises because an increase in household size would not 
only help to increase labour income and diversify income sources and but also increase 
demand for consumption and other basic needs (Nagarajan and Schreiner, 1998). Using 
Heckman selection model this study seeks to ascertain whether household size has any 
influence on household participation and number of loans in micro-credit groups in Kenya. 
It is often believed that higher education gives households the ability to perceive, 
interpret and respond to new information faster than their counterparts with lower education 
(Feder et al., 1985). Khandker (2005) using a multiple regression model indicated a negative 
relationship between education of households and participation in credit programs. These 
results were consistent with Nguyen (2007) who found education to be negatively related to 
credit program participation using a probit model. However, using logit model Zaman (1996) 
found educational variable measured by average years of schooling, to have no influence on 
the depth of participation in micro-credit programs. Awunyo-vitor et al., 2012 found that 
increase in years of schooling is associated with women participation in microcredit. It is, 
therefore, established that higher education fosters participation in microcredit. Using probit 
model in the first stage of Heckman selection model this study seeks to find out the influence 
of years of education on household participation in micro-credit groups. 
 Gender of the borrower is hypothesized to have a positive relationship to micro-credit 
group participation because female are disadvantaged compared to the male in terms of 
collaterals. According to Barslund and Tarp (2007) and Nguyen (2007) there is no gender 
bias in microcredit participation in the peri-urban areas in contrast to what is in rural 
Vietnam. This is consistent to the findings of Doan et al. (2010) using Tobit model that 
gender does not really matter in credit participation but it plays a role in explaining loan size. 
Their findings showed that male-headed households received lower amounts of loans than 
female headed households. The finding is contrary to the common trend in developing 
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countries because females are often involved in small businesses which need smaller loans 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). Similar findings have been found by Owour (2009) who 
indicated immense involvement of women in rural economy as well as the fact that women 
get more attracted to micro-credit groups that peg no tangible credit to lending, reason being 
that a majority of women in Africa still lack right to property to hold as collateral against 
credit. 
 Literature on age of the borrower is diverse, Anjugam and Ramasamy (2007) using 
Probit model found age to have a negative influence in explaining women participation in the 
microfinance programme in their case, as the age of women increased by the probability of 
participation of women in the microfinance programme decreased by per cent, indicating that 
as the age of women increased, they could not participate in the programme effectively. Ha, 
1999 using logit model found age to negatively influence the probability of credit 
participation, but it has a positive effect on loan size. This is corroborates with results of 
(Duy, 2012) using double hurdle model who found age to have no influence on decision to 
borrow but significantly influenced the amount borrowed. Further conformity has been 
revealed by Doan et al., 2010 where age of household head has a positive effect on loan size. 
In their finding the relatively older households tend to receive greater loans, since younger 
households have a smaller labour force, and hence have lower ability to earn and repay.  
Land size can be used as a proxy for wealth and due to its centrality it is an important  
determinant of mode of borrowing to be chosen by a household. Land holding size display a 
significant impact on household borrowing activities. However literature on the influence of  
land size on group participation and level of particpation is mixed. According to Diagne 
(1999) higher share of land was negatively correlated with the access to formal credit. 
Nguyen (2007) using both Probit and Tobit regression found the coefficient of land holding 
size and household assets which are the most used collateral to be significant and affected 
credit programme participation. In the study by (Bokosi and Fredrick, 2004) small landholder 
farmers were found to be too poor to benefit from formal credit, group guarantee mechanism 
ensured that they had access to adequate credit and inputs. Zaman (1996) using the land data 
in Bangladesh suggests the ultra poor do take part in credit groups while the relative lack of 
participation of female headed households suggests that land is the barrier to entry for the 
most vulnerable in society. Similar results have been found by (Izumida and Pham, 2002). 
Duy (2012) using Heckman two step procedure found total land size to be significant in 
determining both household participation in credit programme and the size loan. This study 
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makes use of farm size variable in hectares to determine its influence on group participation 
and level of participation. 
Interest rate is of great concern in determining both the participation and level of 
participation in credit groups (Khanh, 2011). The dominance of plurality of interest rates in 
the informal credit markets is still confusing (Gill, 2003). In rural settings of Pakistan, the 
interest rate charged by moneylenders was 40% per annum (Aleem, 1990). Evidence from 
India showed that informal interest rate varied from 20% to 120% (Timberg and Aiyar, 1984) 
the high interest charged in Pakistan and India could explain why micro-credit groups are 
widespread in both countries. However, Diagne et al. (2000) found that household and 
farmers would borrow more if additional credit were available at given interest rates even if it 
was higher than normal rates of interest. It is also in the interest of this study to find out the 
influence of interest rate on household participation and level of participation in micro-credit 
groups. 
The impact of distance to the nearest financial institutions from the household 
dwelling palaces shows that households far away from financial institutions could have better 
community relationships and interpersonal trust, therefore social capital helps them have easy 
access to informal credit sources (Ineye and Oboh, 2011). Deviating from this (Nguyen, 
2007; Barslund and Tarp, 2007) found that distance to nearest financial institution has no 
effect on credit programme participation. Further attesting to this Doan et al., 2010 using 
logit model indicated that distance to the nearest banks has no significant influence on to loan 
sizes. This study sought to find out the influence of distance to the nearest financial 
institutions on household access and repayment performance in study area. 
2.6 The Factors Influencing Group Loan Repayment Performance 
Loan repayment performance has previously been investigated and reported in 
literature. Different econometric models have been applied to explain the effects of certain 
explanatory variables on repayment capacity of borrowers and results are also diverse. Some 
of these techniques are the ordinary least square (OLS) regression technique, the logit and 
probit analysis and the Tobit analysis. Depending on the choice of model, studies have 
attempted to measure the dependent variable, repayment rate, in different ways. First, the 
actual amount of unpaid loan in analysis of determinants of loan repayment among 
smallholder farmers in Ogbomoso agricultural zone of Oyo State, Nigeria (Oladeebo and 
Oladeebo, 2008). Secondly, the proportion or percentage of loan repaid at a given point in 
time using tobit model (Afolabi, 2010 and Oke et al., 2007). Thirdly, dummy captured as 1, if 
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borrower repaid in full and 0, if otherwise, has been used as dependent variables for 
logit/probit analysis (Kohansal and Mansoori, 2009; Roslan and Karim, 2009; Oni et al., 
2005). This study adopted tobit model because the repayment rate (dependent variable) is 
continuous and is censored at a lower bound of zero (0) and an upper bound of hundred 
(100). In cases where dependent variable is continous, an OLS model will lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Greene, 2011). Using a Probit or Logit would forego valuable 
information because the continuous dependent variable would need to be transformed into 
dummy variables. 
The age of borrowers affects the loan repayment performance of the group as well as 
the individual. This variable was expected to influence the dependent variable positively. 
Vigano (1993) noted that with increase in age, it is usually expected that borrowers get more 
stability and experience in their business consequently they can generate high income leading 
to high repayment performance. Attesting to this Berhanu (2005) and Godquin (2004) found 
concurrent results arguing that elder borrowers may accumulate more wealth than youngsters 
and they feel responsibility for the loan. On the other hand, Fikirte (2011) noted in his study 
that age of the borrower was negative and significantly influenced loan repayment 
performance. This result is in line with the findings study done by Abafita (2003). The 
current endeavor therefore strives to establish the influence of the borrower’s age on group 
loan repayment performance. 
Many reasons have been given to explain the superiority of women over men relative 
to loan repayment. The prudence of women in their investment strategies has been cited as 
one of the reasons (Todd, 1996). Sensitivity of women to peer-pressure and interventions of 
loan managers has been put forward by Goetz and Gupta (1996) as one of the reasons for 
laudable women repayment records. Prospects of having access to credit as and when needed 
coupled with limited sources of credit have also been advanced as one of the motivators of 
appreciable repayment records of women (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005). The basic 
argument behind lending to women is that they are good credit risks, are less likely to misuse 
the loan, and are more likely to share the benefits with others in their household, especially 
their children (Garikipati, 2008). Notwithstanding the above empirical results, there are 
studies that challenge the validity of superiority of women borrowers over their male 
counterparts in terms of loan repayment for instance Bhatt and Tang (2002) find no 
significant relationship. However, the study of Godquin (2004) in Bangladesh indicates that 
correlation between gender and repayment is positive but not significant. Due to such diverse 
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findings, this study sought to find out gender influence on group loan repayment 
performance. 
Education level is expected to have a positive impact on repayment performance. A 
more educated borrower is expected to use the loan effectively as compared to a less 
educated one (Brehanu and Fufa, 2008). Education increases borrowers’ ability to get, 
process and use the necessary information. In line with this, educated borrowers may develop 
the entrepreneurial skill and they may engage in new business with higher returns thereby 
ensuring good loan repayment performance. A study by Gebeyehu (2002) employing tobit 
model established that the level of education enhances loan repayment. Contrary, using a 
probit model Abafita (2003) ascertained that educational level is negatively related to loan 
repayment. This study uses years of education instead of the level of education while 
employing a tobit model to determine the influence of years of education on group loan 
repayment performance. 
Household size is critical in determining loan repayment performance of the 
borrowers (Onyeagocha et al., 2012). If there are many family members in the household 
then they need more income in order to cover the expense of their household members. 
Therefore, the borrower may use the loan directly for their daily consumption and other 
expense. In this case the default rate will be increased. Afolabi (2010) and Ojiako and 
Ogbukwa (2012) using logit and OLS regression respectively found that household size had a 
significant negative influence on loan repayment performance. However, Chirwa (1997) 
found no statistically significant effect of household size on loan repayment performance. 
The present study also sought to use the same variable in verifying its influence on group 
loan repayment performance. 
Number of visits by loan officers is one of the important requirements for the success 
of microfinance institution (Assefa et al., 2005). If the lender provides frequent number of 
visits, the group members will able to understand the rules and regulations easily. They also 
develop skill on how to do business and money utilization. This form of training is needed 
not only for borrowers but also for loan officers. In both cases it has a positive contribution to 
the repayment rate. Oke et al. (2007) using tobit model concur on the importance number of 
visits by loan officers such that increasing number of visits decreases of loan default rate. 
This study also uses this variable to determine its influence on loan repayment performance 
in Uasin Gishu County using the tobit model. 
Von Pischke (1991) noted that efficient loan sizes fit borrowers’ repayment capacity 
and stimulate enterprise. If the amount of loan released is enough for the purposes intended, it 
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will have a positive impact on the borrower’s capacity to repay. On the other hand, in case of 
over and under finance, the expected sign is negative. If the amount of loan exceeds what the 
borrower needs and can handle, it will be more of a burden than help and extra funds may go 
toward personal use (Norell, 2001), thereby undermining repayment performance. In his 
study Abafita (2003) found that loan size is negatively related to loan repayment to him if the 
loan is too small it may encourage borrowers to divert the loan to other purposes which my 
lead to loan default. Loan size variable is also incorporated in the current study to determine 
the effect it has on group loan repayment performance. 
Increasing group size, reflected by the number of group members, is expected to 
augment the repayment rate (Zeller, 1996). With increasing group size, economies in scope, 
scale, and risk management can be realized by the group. Given a limited time and budget 
and the need to achieve certain management targets, such as a high repayment rate, the loan 
officers may also tend to visit larger groups more frequently, as unit costs per member 
serviced tend to be lower. Furthermore, larger groups have more opportunities to exploit 
scale effects through joint procurement of inputs and marketing of outputs, thus increasing 
their negotiation power to obtain more favorable prices. On the other hand, Lawal et al. 
(2009) demonstrated that large groupsize beyond a manageable level will disproportionately 
increase the internal management and monitoring costs, and jeopardize social cohesion of the 
group, which then creates a moral hazard and free-rider problems creating high loan default 
rates. Group size variable measured by the number of members in a given micro-credit group 
was incorporated in this study to establish its influence on group loan repayment 
performance. 
The literature reviewed in this study revealed consensus results among some variables 
which were analyzed in different studies. However, there is controversy with respect to some 
variables which could be attributed to the use of different models in analysis. The review also 
identified that limited studies have been conducted on the effect of social capital dimensions 
group performance. This study seeks to employ the Heckman two step procedure to 
determine the factors influencing household participation and level of participation in micro-
credit groups and a Tobit model to determine social capital dimensions and other factors that 
influence group loan repayment performance. 
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
 The decision to either participate in micro-credit groups or not in this study is built on 
utility theory which depends on whether group borrowing scheme gives the household higher 
19 
 
utility than the individual borrowing scheme. Participation/adoption studies involve two 
stages: The decision to either participate/adopt or not and in the second stage, the level of 
participation/adoption (Mercer and Pattanayak, 2003). The decision to either participate in 
micro-credit groups or not is dichotomous and therefore a binary choice model has been 
identified as appropriate for such estimation. However, this is only possible under the 
following assumptions: that the households are faced with only two alternative choices and 
that any choice an individual chooses depends on their characteristics (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1997). 
 The expected net utility derived from participation in micro-credit groups or not given 
household’s characteristics is determined as follows: 
 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑃 = 𝑓 𝑊𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 .................................................................................................... (1) 
 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑁 = 𝑓 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 ..................................................................................................... (2) 
Where, 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑃 is the expected net utility of household i from participating in group borrowing 
while 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑁 is the expected net utility of household i from individual borrowing, P denotes 
group borrowing while N denotes individual borrowing. 𝑋𝑖  and 𝑊𝑖  are independent variables 
denoting social capital dimensions, institutional and household characteristics and  𝑒𝑖  is an 
error term. The expected net utility from each of the decisions will then be compared. To 
compare, 𝑌𝑖  will be used as an indicator of whether household i participates in micro-credit 
group or not, so that 𝑌𝑖=1 if it participates and 𝑌𝑖= 0 if not, as indicated in equation (3) below.  
  
𝑌𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑃 − 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑁 > 0
𝑌𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑃 − 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑁 < 0
  ................................................................................... (3)  
Equation (3) implies that the probability that the household i participates in group borrowing 
is given by the probability that the expected net utility derived from group borrowing is 
greater than the expected net utility derived from individual borrowing. While the probability 
that the household i borrows individually is given by the probability that the expected net 
utility derived from group borrowing is less than the  net utility derived from individual 
borrowing. 
2.7 Conceptual Framework 
When faced with limited credit access rural households make decisions with a motive 
of increasing their credit access as well as improving repayment performance. However, what 
is observed is type of borrowing decision. To model the household access to credit the first 
step is to analyze rural household type of borrowing. Assuming that a household has two 
alternative types of borrowing i.e group and individual borrowing, then their decision will 
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depend on the relative advantage of each of type of borrowing and its contribution to 
repayment performance. Any borrowing type with more expected access to credit has a 
higher likelihood that it will be chosen. As shown figure 1 various factors inter-relate to 
influence household access to credit and repayment performance. 
 This study is built on the premise that joining and actively participating in a micro-
credit group results in improved credit access and repayment performance. Therefore 
households who join and actively participate in micro-credit group are expected to benefit 
from access to credit without collaterals and improved repayment performance. The decisions 
to either join a micro-credit group or not are assumed to be determined by household 
demographic factors, farm attributes and institutional factors. The next stage in group 
borrowing category is the level of participation in the micro-credit groups measured by the 
number of loans borrowed by each individual group member. This is influenced by an 
additional set of variables social capital dimensions. On the other hand, those who have 
tangible collaterals opt for individual borrowing category. 
The dependent variables in this study were participation/joining a micro-credit group 
and the level of participation in the micro-credit group. To model such decision making 
process Tobit, Heckman two step procedures and double hurdle models could be used 
however, faced with such situations, the assumption of simultaneous and sequential decisions 
are usually considered. A Tobit model assumes that household makes the decision 
simultaneously (Sindi, 2008). The Heckman two step procedure and double hurdle models 
use two stage procedures where first stage models the household’s choice to join micro-credit 
group and second stage models the level of participation. 
In this study the decision to join a micro-credit group and the level of participation 
may not necessarily be jointly determined. Consequently, the decision to join a micro-credit 
group could precede the level of participation depending on the prevailing factors. In such a 
scenario there is high likelihood that household will only increase their number of borrowings 
if there is a strong cohesion within micro-credit group enhanced by social capital dimensions. 
In this study the factors that determine decision to join a micro-credit group and the decision 
on level of participation are different given the existence of social capital dimensions which 
only determine the household number of borrowings. Additionally, since observed number of 
borrowings is nonrandom and conditional on the decision to join a micro-credit group then 
sample selection problem is introduced. To correct this Heckman two step procedure is a 
suitable model and consequently is adopted for this study. Double hurdle model unsuitable as 
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it assumes that the same factors that determine participation also determine level of 
participation. 
To determine the factors influencing micro-credit group loan repayment performance, 
logit, probit and Tobit analysis have been used (Oke et al., 2007; Afolabi, 2010 and Roslan 
and Karim, 2009). The dependent variable in this case is the repayment rate computed as a 
percentage of total loan repaid to the total loan borrowed. Since dependent variable ranges 
between 0 and 100 an appropriate model is Tobit. The other models assume that the 
dependent variable is dummy whereby complete loan repayment takes the value 1 and 0 
otherwise. Under such assumption we lose important information about those who have 
partly repaid as they are assumed to be loan defaulters. Given this weakness this study 
adopted a Tobit model to determine social capital dimensions and other factors influencing 
household loan repayment performance. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework Showing the Factors Influencing Micro-Credit Group 
Participation and Loan Repayment Performance 
Source: Author’s Conceptualization. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Study Area 
 The study was carried out in Moiben Division, Uasin Gishu County. The County is 
one of the 47 counties of Kenya. It extends between longitude 34° 50′ and 35° 37′ East and 0° 
03′ and 0° 55′ North with a total area of 3327.8 km2. It borders six counties namely Elgeyo 
Marakwet to the East, Trans Nzoia to the North, Kericho to the South, Baringo to the South 
East,  Nandi to the South West and Bungoma to the West. Eldoret is its headquarters as well 
as its commercial centre. Moiben division consists of 6 locations and has a total area of 778 
km
2
 with a population of 92,717 (DAO, 2001). Figure 1 shows the map of Uasin Gishu 
District presently Uasin Gishu County. The main economic activities in the county include 
both large and small scale maize and wheat farming, passion fruit growing, dairy farming, 
sports (Athletics), Manufacturing and agro processing. Financial services in the county 
include nineteen (19) Commercial banks and eleven (11) Micro-FinanceInstitutions. 
3.2 Sample and Sampling Method 
 Multi-stage sampling method was used to obtain appropriate sample size. First, 
Uasin-Gishu County was purposively selected. Within Uasin-Gishu County, Moiben division 
was purposively selected because it had high concentration of micro-credit groups in the 
County. Second, the borrowers in the division were stratified into two groups: those who 
borrowed through groups (group borrowers) and those who borrowed individually. In the 
group borrowing category purposive sampling of micro-credit groups which have been 
operating for the past two years since their formation was done using list of micro-credit 
groups obtained from Faulu Kenya, Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT), Kenya Agency 
for the Development of Enterprise and Technology (KADET) and Small and Micro 
Enterprise Programme (SMEP). A total 29 micro-credit groups were found to have been 
operating for the last two years, within these groups, 4 respondents were selected randomly to 
give a sample 116. Simple random sampling was employed to select 58 individual borrowers 
to act as a control group. This gave a total of 174 respondents for the study. Primary data was 
collected using a structured questionnaire. Data on socio-economic factors, institutional 
factors and social capital dimensions was collected. 
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Figure 2: Uasin Gishu County Map. 
Source: Adopted from Baraza et al. (2008)  
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3.3 Sampling Method 
 The required sample size was determined using proportionate to size sampling 
method by Anderson et al. (2007).  
 𝑛 =
𝑝𝑞𝑍 2
𝐸2
...................................................................................................................... (4) 
Where n = sample size, p = proportion of the population containing the major interest, q= 1-p, 
z= confidence level (α = 0.05), E = acceptable/allowable error. Since the proportion of the 
population is not known, p=0.5, q = 1-0.5= 0.5, Z = 1.96 and E = 0.075. This resulted to a 
sample size of 174 respondents. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
 SPSS computer program was used to determine borrowers socio-economic 
characteristics. STATA program was used to estimate Heckman two-step procedure to 
determine factors influencing micro-credit group participation and level of participation. 
Tobit model was used to determine the household loan repayment performance.  
3.5 Social Capital Dimensions 
 The social capital dimensions used in the analysis include: density of membership, 
heterogeneity index, meeting attendance index, cash contribution and decision making index. 
The measurement of each is as described below as used by (Lawaal et al., 2009; 
Okunmadewa et al., 2007; Yusuf, 2008). 
Density of membership: This was captured by the summation of the total number of groups 
to which the household belongs, that is the group membership by individuals is summed up. 
The households where asked to indicate the micro-credit group which they have active 
membership. 
Heterogeneity index: This is an aggregation of the responses of each household to the 
questions on the diversity of members of their micro-credit group. Within their group each 
household answered questions on whether members are of same age group, same gender, 
same education level, same occupation and same economic status. Hence, for each of the 
factors a Yes response is coded 0 while No response is coded 1. A maximum score of 5 
represents the highest level of heterogeneity and a minimum of 0 represent the highest level 
of homogeneity. These scores were then divided by the maximum score of 5 to obtain an 
index which is then multiplied by hundred. A zero value represents complete homogeneity 
while 100 represent complete heterogeneity (Yusuf, 2008). 
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Meeting attendance index: This is obtained by summing up the attendance of household 
members to meetings and dividing it by the number of scheduled meetings per month in the 
micro-credit group they belong to get an index. This value was multiplied by 100. 
Cash contribution: This was obtained by the summation of the total cash contributed to the 
group which the household belong. 
Decision making Index: This is calculated by summation of the subjective responses of 
households on their rating in the participation in the decision making. The responses were 
averaged across the three groups and multiplied by 100 for each household.The questionnaire 
asked group members to evaluate subjectively whether they were “very active” “active”  
“passive” “very passive” or not participating in the group’s decision making. This response 
was scaled from 4 to 0, respectively. Each response value was divided by a maximum of 4 to 
get an index and multiplied by 100 for each household (Okunmadewa et al., 2007). 
3.6 Empirical Models 
 Descriptive analysis and two empirical models (Heckman two-step procedure and 
Tobit model) were used to estimate the desired variables. Descriptive analysis in objective 
one was used to characterize the socio-economic attributes of the respondents. In the second 
objective, Heckman two-step procedure was used to determine factors influencing 
participation in micro-credit groups and the level of participation. Tobit model was used in 
the last objective to determine the factors influencing group repayment performance. 
3.6.1 Heckman Two-step Procedure 
The Heckman two-step model was used to extract determinants of household 
participation in micro credit groups. It involves estimation of two equations: Selection 
equation in the first step and outcome equation in the second step (Heckman, 1979). First is 
whether a household participates in micro-credit groups or not then second is the level of 
participation (number of loans). The number of loans borrowed by individual through the 
micro-credit group is conditional on the decision to participate in the group. Previous studies 
show that, estimation of such relationships is normally problematic due to sample selection 
bias. 
 The two-steps include; first a Probit model for participation or selection equation is 
estimated. This step estimates the probability of group participation as shown in the equation 
(5) below. 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝛿𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,     𝐸 
𝜀𝑖
𝑍  = 0 ................................................................................... (5) 
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Where, 𝑃𝑖  is a dummy for participation in micro-credit group while 𝑍𝑖  is a vector of variables 
that affect participation decision. The next equation explains the level participation. 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 ,  𝐸 
𝜇𝑖
𝑋  = 0 .................................................................................... (6) 
Where; 𝑌𝑖  indicates the level of participation measured in terms of number of loans by a 
borrower, 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of variables that explain the levels of participation, 𝜀𝑖  and 𝜇𝑖  are the 
error terms.The model assumes that Z and X are observable exogenous variables and X is a 
subset of Z. If the correlation between 𝜀𝑖  and 𝜇𝑖   is not zero it brings about the selection bias 
problem. After estimating the selection equation a non selection bias is computed using 
equation (7) below. 
𝐸  
𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑖
 ,𝑍𝑖 ................................................................................................................ (7) 
Which is called Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) λ δZi  when 𝑃𝑖=1 (Wooldridge, 2002). Then the 
new lambda is used in the selection equation (6) as an explanatory variable. The new 
equation for the second stage regression is therefore: 
𝐸 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖 ,𝑃𝑖 = 1 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜌λ(δZi)......................................................................... (8) 
Equation (8) gives the expected number of loans 𝑌𝑖  given vectors of observable factors 𝑍𝑖  and 
given that the household has already made the decision to participate in micro-credit group. 
This can be explained by vector of observable characteristics 𝑋𝑖  and the Inverse Mills Ratio 
evaluated as, λ δZi . 
If 𝑃𝑖=0 then there is no evidence of the selection bias and the regression reverts to OLS. But 
if 𝑃𝑖≠0 then there were omitted variables in the initial model correlated with 𝑋𝑖  which is 
corrected by including IMR in the second regression.  
The two steps are specified as follows 
Step 1. Selection equation (Probit). 
BLNGTOGRP=β0+β1AGE+β2GENDER+β3EDUC+β4HHSIZE+β5FMSIZE+β6YRSDVSN+ 
β7AWARENESS+β8INTRSTRATE+β9LANDTNR+β10DSTNC+β11LnFRMINCM+ 
β12MAINOCCP+ε....................................................................................................................(9) 
Step 2. Outcome equation (Linear regression) 
NUBORRWNGS=β0+β1AGE+β2GENDER+β3EDUC+β4HHSIZE+β5FMSIZE+β6MAINOC
CP+β7GRPSIZE+β8MTNGATNDCINDX+β9HETEROINDX+β10LnCSHCNTBN+β11DECS
NINDX+β12DSTYMBSHP+β13INTRSTRATE+β14EXPERNCE+ε................................... (10) 
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Table 1: Description of Variables used in Heckman Two-step Procedure 
Variable Code Description Measurement  Sign 
BLNGTOGRP Membership in microcredit group  1=group,0=Individual(Dummy)  
AGE Age of borrower Years (continuous) + 
GENDER Sex of the borrower 1=Male,0=Female (Dummy) +/- 
EDUC Years of fromal education Years (continuous) - 
HHSIZE Number of household members Number of members  + 
FMSIZE Total household farm size Hectares  (Continuous) +/- 
MAINOCCP Household main occupation  1= Farming, 0= Otherwise  + 
LANDTNR Land tenure system 1=with title, 0=Otherwise  +/- 
AWARENESS Awareness of group borrowing 1=Yes 0= No (Dummy) + 
INTRSTRATE Loan interest  rate Percentage (Continous) - 
GRPSIZE Number of members in the micro-
credit group 
Number of members 
(continuous) 
- 
MTNGATNDCINDX Index derived from the number of 
meeting per month 
Generated index (continuous) + 
HETEROINDX Index derived from age, education 
level, level of wealth and gender 
variables 
Generated index (continuous) +/- 
LnCSHCNTBN Amount contributed per month Kenya shillings (continuous) +/- 
DECSNINDX Index derived from level of 
participation in group decision 
making 
Ranging fromVery active to not 
participating (Categorical) 
+/- 
DSTYMBSHP Number of groups one is a 
member 
Number (continuous) + 
3.6.2 Tobit Model 
To evaluate the repayment performance of the micro-credit groups, the variable loan 
repayment rate (REPYMTRATE) was used as a dependent variable in the Tobit model which 
meant the amount of current loan already repaid as at the end of July 2012. The loan 
repayment rate (REPYMTRATE) was computed as a percentage of total loan amount repaid 
to the total loan borrowed. The variable was zero in the case of non repayment on the 
schedule time and was equal to 100 in the case of complete repayment. Tobit regression 
model which is based on maximum likelihood technique (Maddala, 1983; Gujarati, 2004) 
was used. The structural equation of the Tobit model is given as: 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖  …...................................................................................................…(11) 
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Where 𝑌𝑖
∗ is a latent variable for the i
th
 group borrower that is observed for values 
greater than τ and censored for values less than or equal to τ. The Tobit model can be 
generalized to take account of censoring both from below and from above. X is a vector of 
independent variables postulated to influence repayment rate. The β’s are parameters 
associated with the independent variables to be estimated. The ε is the independently 
distributed error term assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a constant 
variance. Of course, we could collapse all positive observations on 𝑌𝑖 and treat this as a 
binomial probit or logit estimation problem, but doing so would discard the information on 
the amount repaid by the borrower as at a certain time. Hence observed Y is defined by the 
following generic equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌
∗𝑖𝑓𝑌∗ > τ
Yi = 𝑌
∗𝑖𝑓𝑌∗ ≤ τ
 ……………….......................................................................…..(12) 
Typically, the Tobit model assumes that τ = 0 which means that the data is censored at zero. 
However, repayment rate of borrowers range between 0-100, Thus substituting τ in equation 
12 above yields. 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌
∗𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑌∗ < 100
𝑌𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓𝑌
∗ ≤ 0
𝑌𝑖 = 100 𝑖𝑓𝑌
∗ ≥ 100
 …….........................................................................….(13) 
The model assumes that there is an underlying repayment rate equal to  𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖  which is 
observed only when it is repayment rate between 0 and 100; otherwise qualifies as an 
unobserved latent variable. The dependent variable is not normally distributed since its values 
range between 0 and 100. 
The empirical Tobit model for this study therefore takes the following form: 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑛
𝑛=1 . 
𝑌𝑖
∗= β0 + βiX1+ β1X2+ β2X3+ β3X4+... βnXn+ ε......................................................................(14) 
REPYMTRATE(𝑌𝑖
∗)=β0+β1AGE+β2GENDER+β3EDUC+β4HHSIZE+5FMSIZE+ 
β6LnTTLINCM+β7LANDTNR+β8DSTNC+β9GRPSIZE+β10LnLNSIZE+β11VISITS+β12EXP
ERNCE+β13PEERPRSRE+β14MTNGATNDCINDX+β15HETEROINDX+β16LnCSHCNTBN
+β17DECSNMKNGINDX+β18DSTYMBSHP+ε..................................................................(15) 
It is worth nothing that estimating the model using OLS would produce both 
inconsistent and biased estimates (Gujarati, 2004). This is because OLS underestimates the 
true effect of the parameters by reducing the slope (Goetz, 1995). Therefore, the maximum 
likelihood estimation is recommended for Tobit analysis. 
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Table 2: Description of Variables used in the Tobit Model 
Variable Code Description Measurement Sign 
REPYMTRATE Amount repaid divided by 
total amount borrowed 
multiplied by 100 
Percentage  (continous) +/- 
AGE Number of years of borrower Years (continuous) +/- 
GENDER Sex of the borrower  1=Male, 0=Female 
(Dummy) 
+/- 
EDUC Years of formal education Years (continuous) + 
HHSIZE Number of household 
members 
Number of members 
(continuous) 
+ 
LnTTLINCM Total household income Kenya Shillings (continuous)  
FMSIZE Total household farm size Hectares (Continuous) + 
LANDTNR Land tenure system  1=with title, 0=Otherwise  + 
DSTNC Distance from borrower 
dwelling place to the MFI 
Kilometers (continous) - 
GRPSIZE Number of members in the 
micro-credit group 
Number of members 
(continuous) 
- 
LnLNSIZE Amount of loan borrowed  Kenya Shillings (continuous) - 
INTRSTRATE Loan interest  rate  Percentage (continuous) - 
EXPERNCE Number of years participating 
group borrowing 
Years (Continous) + 
VISITS Number of visits by loan 
officer to the micro-credit 
Number of visits (Continous) + 
PEERPRSRE Level of peer pressure within 
the group. 
Ranging from No pressure to 
Extremely strong pressure 
 
+ 
MTNGATNDCINDX Generated index   Index (continuous) + 
HETEROINDX Generated index  Generated index (continuous) +/- 
LnCSHCNTBN Contribution per month Kenya shillings (continuous) +/- 
DECSNINDX Level of decision making  Categorical +/- 
DSTYMBSHP Number of groups one is a 
member 
Number of groups 
(continuous) 
+/- 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 This chapter presents the results and discussions. First, the background information of 
respondents is presented; these are compared between individual borrowers and group 
borrowers and tested statistically using the t-test and chi square to determine whether there 
are any significant differences between them. Second, the factors influencing participation 
and level of participation in micro-credit groups are presented and lastly, the factors that 
influence the repayment performance in the micro-credit groups. 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
4.1.1 Socio-economic Characteristics of Group and Individual Borrowers 
 Table 3 shows the results of the test of significance for the continuous household 
socioeconomic variables disaggregated by type of borrowing. The mean age of the entire 
sample was 41.24 years, with the mean age for individual and group borrowers being 44.69 
and 39.52 years respectively. These results clearly show that individual borrowers were 
relatively older than group borrowers. This is further affirmed by the t-test which is 
significant at 1percent level revealing that individual borrowers had a significantly higher 
mean age than their counterpart group borrowers. The reason could be because older persons 
are already established while the younger borrowers are in the process of getting established 
hence join micro-credit groups inorder to  initiated projects likely to yield rapid results to 
meet their ambitions. This is consistent with Davis et al. (2010) results who found out that 
younger farmers were more likely to participate in farmer field school groups than the older 
farmers in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. 
The results on household size showed that the mean household size was 6 persons for 
the total sample. Similarly, individual borrower’s category and the group borrower’s category 
also had 6 persons. This shows that there is no difference in the household size for the two 
borrowing categories. The t-test also indicates that that there is no significant difference 
between group and individual borrowers in terms of household size.  
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Table 3: Household Characteristics by Type of Borrower in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya (Continuous variables) 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively 
 
Individual=58 Group=116 Pooled=174 
 Variable Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean  Std.dev T-test 
Age (Years)         44.69           7.54         39.52           4.89         41.24           6.37  5.451*** 
Household size (Number)           5.64           1.92           5.59           2.00           5.61           1.97  0.136 
Farm size (Ha)           4.29           2.48           2.46           1.11           3.07           1.89  6.730*** 
Education (Years)         12.42           2.89         10.17           3.19         11.02           3.31  5.126*** 
Years in the Division         19.37         10.90         20.14           9.89         20.08         10.21 -0.105 
Farm income (KES.) 149482.80 116614.80   55301.72   51954.36   86695.40   84284.60  5.697*** 
Off-farm income (KES.) 280862.10 214093.60   80689.66   76742.74 147413.80 145418.17  8.753*** 
Total income (KES.) 430344.80 233057.20 135991.40 104678.00 234109.20 211057.60 11.501*** 
Loan size (KES.) 229137.90 118488.80   61250.00   28059.53 117212.60 106999.90 14.507*** 
Distance to financial inst. (KM)         12.82           7.58         20.44           8.69         17.90           9.06 -5.682*** 
Interest rate (percent)         19.89           2.90         22.19           3.32         20.66           3.36  4.487** 
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Farm size characteristic results shows that the mean size of land for the total sample 
in hectares is 3.07 while that of individual and group borrowers was 4.29 and 2.46 hectares 
respectively. The t-test indicates that there is a significant difference between individual and 
group borrowers with regard to farm size at 1 percent level. Since individual borrowers had a 
larger farm size as compared to the group borrowers this could be the reason why they access 
credit individually as their land can act as collateral required to access individual credit. 
Correspondingly, the smaller pieces of land by group borrowers could constrain them from 
acquiring individual loans, making them join borrowing groups to access credit.  
 It was necessary to analyze the years of education of the borrowers since literacy is 
supportive to obtaining credit. The years of education of the applicants positively influence 
the granting of credit by the lending institutions. This is because the literate are expected to 
keep records of their enterprises which is a good basis for assessing of viability Ayamaga et 
al. (2011). Majority of the borrowers (97.70 percent) had acquired formal education. 
Individual borrowers had higher mean years of schooling of 12 compared to group borrowers 
who had a mean of 10 years. These results give a positive indication that rural areas are no 
longer a place for the illiterate therefore well designed credit policies would generate a 
transformation in such areas. The statistical t-test was significant at 1 percent level, 
confirming that indeed individual borrowers were more educated than the group borrowers. 
 Among all the borrowers, majority had been living in Moiben Division for at least 20 
years. The mean years of residence in the Division for the individual borrowers was also 19 
years while the mean for group borrowers was 20 years. This shows that there is no 
significant difference between individual borrowers and group borrowers on the number of 
years of residence the Division. The t-test shows no significance difference. 
The results of household incomes indicate that the mean annual farm income for all 
the sampled households was KES. 86696.40. It is shown that individual borrowers had a 
higher mean annual farm income of KES. 149482.80 compared to KES. 55301.72 obtained 
by their group borrowers’ counterpart. The t-test confirmed this and was strongly significant 
at 1percent level. The farm income comprised of average annual income from all farming 
activities undertaken by the household. 
The entire mean annual off-farm income was KES. 147413.20. Individual borrowers 
had a higher annual off-farm income of KES. 280862.10 compared to KES. 80689.66 earned 
by group borrowers. The statistical significance t-test revealed that the two categories of 
borrowers were different with regard to off-farm income at 1 percent level. Off-farm income 
comprised of average annual income from employment, business, and any other income apart 
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from farm income. This finding presents evidence that off-farm income is vital in influencing 
participation in farmer groups, and is consistent with (Mathenge and Tschirley, 2007) that 
off-farm earning is useful in spreading the risk associated with using modern farm 
technologies in that it provides ready cash for smoothening household consumption. 
The mean distance to the nearest financial institution was 17.90 Km for the entire 
sample. Disaggregating into individual and group borrowers, the results showed that 
individual borrowers travelled for a mean 12.82 Km to the nearest financial institution while 
group borrowers traveled further indicated by 20.44 Km. The t-test was  significant at 1 
percent level indicating that the mean distance to the financial institution for group borrowers 
was significantly greater than that of individual borrowers. This implies that in accessing 
credit, group borrowers were disadvantaged than the individual borrowers in terms of 
distance. This could explain why the longer the distance to the financial institution the higher 
the chance of joining micro-credit group. This is because of the high cost of travelling in 
search for credit. As reviewed by (Okten and Osili, 2004) distance to the nearest financial 
institution in the community was found plausible and had a negative and significant effect on 
the probability of being granted credit. Arguing that the costs of screening and monitoring 
borrowers may rise with distance from the financial institutions. 
Another important factor considered is the size of loan borrowed by the household. 
The mean amount borrowed for the entire households was KES. 117121.60. The amount 
borrowed by the individual borrowers was KES. 229137.90 whereas the mean of group 
borrowers was KES. 61250.00. The t-test for difference in mean loan borrowed was 
significant at 1percent level implying that group borrowers obtained a significantly lower 
loan during the study time than their group borrower’s counterparts. This reflects the limited 
capacity of group borrowing approach arising from social capital and financial institution 
characteristics. 
The interest rate charged for the loan borrowed is an important factor in determining 
the size of loan, number of borrowings and mode of borrowing. The mean annual interest rate 
charged for the whole sample was 20.66 percent. Individual borrowers were charged mean 
annual interest rate of 19.89 percent which is lower than the mean charged for the group 
borrowers of 22.19 percent. The t-test confirmed that there was a significant difference 
between group and individual borrowers with regard to the interest rate at 1percent level. 
This could explain why poorer households joined micro-credit groups. In their study Balogun 
and Yusuf (2011) found that irrespective of the higher level of interest rate in the group 
lending program, households would still pursue credit through this channel because of their 
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dire need and and lack of tangible collaterals to access formal credit. The result was a deviant 
from natural demand that says increase interest rate leads to decrease in quantity of credit 
demanded (Mpuga, 2008). 
The results on household dummy variables gender and land tenure system are 
presented in table 4. In the individual borrowers category 70.69 percent were male and 29.31 
percent were female. In the group borrowing category the percentage of female was relatively 
higher with 63.79 percent compared to the male who were 36.21 percent.  In fact, the chi-
square test was strongly significant at 1 percent level, indicating that there were significantly 
more female borrowers in the group borrowing category than in the individual borrowing 
category. This difference can be attributed to the fact that in Moiben Division as, is in most 
Kenyan communities, the male posses land ownership rights and other capital resources 
which are used as collateral to acquire loans from formal financial institutions. Hence, the 
male are likely to borrow loans as  individuals. Women on the other hand engage in 
microcredit loans obtainable through groups (Chamas). Joining these groups in many 
occasions is involuntary but it is a condition given by lenders. 
Table 4: Household Characteristics by Type of Borrower in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya 
(Dummy variables) 
  
Individual=58 Group=116 
 Variables 
 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Chi2 
Gender                    Male  41 70.69 42 36.21 
 
 
Female 17 29.31 74 63.79 18.43*** 
Land Tenure With title deed 46 79.31 74 62.07 
 
 
Without 12 20.69 42 37.93  4.35** 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively 
 The land tenure system in the Division is comprised of both titled and untitled 
ownership. Results in table 4 point out that 79.31 percent of the individual borrowersowned 
land with title deeds while 20.69 percent were without title deeds. In the group borrowers, 
62.07 percent had title deeds while 37.93 percent did not.  In most cases, title deeds are used 
as collaterals for credit. Slightly higher percentage (37.93 percent) of group borrowers did not 
have title deeds as compared to 20.69 percent of individual borrowers. This may be explained 
that lack of the right to land ownership played a crucial role in joining of micro-credit groups. 
Studies have supported these conclusions for instance there was evidence in Gambia that 
increased individual rights lead to greater credit access and investment, resulting in higher 
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productivity (Hayes et al., 1997). Chi-square tests also revealed that there was a significant 
difference at 5 percent level, with respect to the land tenure system among the two loan 
borrowing categories. 
4.1.2 Social Capital Dimensions 
The summary statistics for five dimensions of social capital dimensions are presented 
in table 5. The results indicate that on average group members attended group scheduled 
meetings per month with a 72.70 percent index of meeting attendance. According to Karlan, 
2006 several activities occur during the scheduled meetings, including loan payments, group 
cash contribution, issuing new loans, training in group operations and the importance of 
group solidarity, and monitoring of loan repayment by all members. The micro-credit groups 
were heterogeneous in terms of age, gender, education level, occupation and economic status 
with a 60.17 percent index of heterogeneity. Social heterogeneity appears to facilitate a 
confidence that other members will indeed repay for the unintended defaulting members, 
augmenting the belief that the group is likely to receive subsequent loans in the future and 
that those who intentionally do not repay in will not get the next round of borrowing Cassar 
et al. (2007). In terms of their monthly contribution all the groups contributed some amount 
of money to the group which is saved and used to run group activities as  required  by the 
microfinance institution. This amount can later be used in case of group inability to repay the 
borrowed loan. The least amount that a group contributed monthly was KES. 400 while the 
maximum was KES. 2500. On average each member contributed KES. 1282.80 monthly to 
the group. 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Social Capital Dimensions in Uasin Gishu County, 
Kenya 
Social Capital Dimensions N Min Max Mean Standard deviation 
Meeting attendance Index 116     0   100     72.70   29.11 
Heterogeneity index 116     0   100     60.17   27.47 
Monthly Cash contribution 116 400 2500 1282.80 408.45 
Decision making index 
Density of membership 
116 
116 
    0 
    1 
  100 
      3 
    75.22 
      1.88 
  26.47 
    0.72 
Decision making index indicate member participation in decision making is an 
average of 75.22 percent index. Lastly, in the density of membership variable, results showed 
that household have membership in at least one (1) micro-credit group and a maximum of 
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three (3) groups. On average households have membership in two (2) micro-credit groups. It 
is widely recognized that efficient and equitable groups are those that allow participation of 
members in the decision making processes, as well as the sharing of benefits and costs Tabi 
(2009). Incorporating members in group decision making, different segments of the society 
feel the need to pool resources within groups which has more capability to voice their needs. 
4.2 Results of Heckman Two-step Procedure 
 Heckman two-step procedure was applied to analyze the socioeconomic, social capital 
dimensions and institutional factors that determine participation and the level of participation 
in the group borrowing program. The procedure was chosen for estimation to correct the 
sample selection bias as proposed by Heckman (1979). The following variables were 
included in the estimation age, gender, household size, years of education, land tenure 
system, awareness to the group borrowing programme, years living in the Division, distance 
to the nearest financial institution, loan interest rate and social capital variables. Post 
estimation of the selection equation results was done to determine marginal effects of 
variables for use in interpretation. The reason is that coefficients have no direct interpretation 
because they are just values that maximize the likelihood function. On the other hand, 
marginal effects have direct interpretation and hence facilitate discussion of the results. 
4.2.1 Factors Influencing Households to Join Micro-credit Groups 
 Both household and loan characteristics significantly influenced the decision to join 
micro-credit group as shown in table 6. These are age, gender, household size, years of 
formal education, farm land size, farm income, loan interest rate and distance to the nearest 
financial institution. The negative signs of marginal effects reduce probability of household 
participating in group borrowing loan scheme while the positive signs increase the probability 
of participating in the loaning schemes. The coefficient of IMR was also significant and 
positive 0.048. 
 Several studies have found the influence of age on micro-credit group participation to 
be either positive or negative. This study found out that age (AGE) significantly and 
negatively influenced household participation in micro-credit group borrowing with marginal 
effect of 0.031. This indicates that an increase in age of the borrower by one year reduced the 
probability of joining micro-credit group by 3.1 percent. This means that other things 
remaining constant as the household age increases they accumulate collateral that enable 
them seek for individual loan. Coupled with this is that the chances of older people being 
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considered for credit are low, and are due to the low probability of success, with the high risk 
of default. This is consistent with the results from Nguyen (2007) who found out that older 
households often have more assets, reputation and meet the requirement for getting formal 
credit in contrast with younger household who often lack capital and other conditions forcing 
them to join micro-credit groups to access informal credit. Ayamaga et al. (2006) also found 
that as age increases, the probability of a farmer to participate in microcredit programmes in 
Northern Ghana, decreased. 
Table 6: Heckman selection equation results on the determinants of participation in 
micro-credit Groups in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya 
Variable Marginal effect  Z P>|z| X 
AGE -0.031  -2.61 0.009*** 41.241 
GENDER (*) -0.281  -2.63 0.009*** 0.477 
HHSIZE  0.077   2.37 0.018** 5.609 
EDUC -0.087  -3.74 0.000*** 11.023 
LANDTNR (*) -0.142  -1.54 0.125 0.689 
FMSIZE -0.229  -3.31 0.001*** 3.066 
MAINOCCP   0.033   0.29 0.774 0.540 
LnFRMINCM  0.033   2.29 0.022** 9.245 
AWARENESS  0.114   1.09 0.275 0.644 
YRSDVSN  0.000   0.04 0.968 20.081 
INTRSTRATE -0.051  -3.65 0.000*** 20.655 
DSTNC  0.018   2.99 0.003*** 17.901 
_cons 12.110   4.40 0.000 
 Mills lambda  0.538  -1.98 0.048** 
 Rho -0.703  
   Sigma  0.765  
   
(*) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively 
 The literature on effect of gender on joining micro-credit groups is ambiguous. This 
study revealed gender of the borrower (GENDER) was significant and negatively influenced 
Number of obs     174 Wald chi
2 
(20) 151.550  
Censored obs   58 Prob>chi
2
     0.000  
Uncensored obs 116 Pseudo R
2
     0.652  
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household to join micro-credit group with a marginal effect of 0.281. This implies that the 
probability of females joining micro-credit group is 28.1 percent higher than men. The 
interpretation is that since female household do not have/own the collaterals required to 
borrow from formal financial institutions such as title deeds, they are forced to join 
borrowing groups  It could also be due to the structure of finacial instutions, for instance  
(Tran, 1997) showed that there are some informal financial institutions which provide credit 
to women only. Elsewhere  (Oladele and Olawuyi, 2012) revealed that gender was important 
in micro-credit group participation in Nigeria though negative which negates aprior 
expectation. This was connected to the predominant female groups in the area. Owour, 
(2009), results on gender indicate immense involvement of women in rural economy as well 
as the fact that women get more  attracted to MFI credit that peg no tangible asset to lending, 
reason being that a majority of  women in Africa still lack right to property to hold as 
collateral against credit. 
 Household size (HHSIZE) significantly and positively influenced household decision 
to join micro-credit group with marginal effect of 0.077. This implies that a unit increase in 
household size increases probability of joining micro-credit group by 7.7 percent. The 
positive sign indicate that individuals with large household size were likely to join micro-
credit groups since they have more family burden to contain with, in terms of social and 
economic services, and therefore need support to meet their family daily needs. Simtowe and 
Zeller (2006) concur with this stating that having a bigger family, ceteris paribus increased 
the demand for loans, because per capita income is smaller for big households. Doan et al. 
(2010) in the same way support this finding that greater household size represents a bigger 
demand for consumption and a better ability for income generation and debt repayment. 
Asante et al. (2010) found that household size had no influence on household decision to join 
farmer based organizations. 
 Years of formal education (EDUC) was negatively significant in influencing the 
decision to join micro-credit groups with a marginal effect of 0.087. This demonstrates that 
an increase in one year of education decreases the probability of joining micro-credit group 
by 8.7 percent. The underlying assumption is that more years of formal education help 
households to find paid jobs hence can access formal loans which do not need one to join a 
micro-credit group. This concludes that increase in years of formal education did not 
determine micro-credit group participation. This result concurs with those of Aqsa et al. 
(2005) and Nguyen (2007) who found out that years of education of head of household had 
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negative effect on the access to credit, that if years of education increase there is a significant 
decrease in participation to credit programme. 
 Size of farm land (FMSIZE) was significant and negatively influenced household 
decision to join micro-credit group with a marginal effect of 0.229. The interpretation is that 
an increase in household land size by one hectare reduces the probability of the household to 
join micro-credit group by 22.9 percent. This is because large farm sizes can be used as 
collateral to access formal credit from commercial banks. Those with smaller parcels of land 
therefore find it prudent to join credit borrowing groups in order to access credit. Asante et al. 
(2010) and Davis et al. (2010) found that farm size positively influenced farmers’ decisions 
to join farmer based organizations. 
 Farming income (LnFRMINCM) was found to be positively significant with a 
marginal effect of 0.033. This implies that an increase in farming income by one Kenyan 
shilling increases the probability of joining borrowing groups by 3.3 percent. This concurs 
with the results of Asante et al. (2010) who found that farm income had the expected positive 
sign and was highly significant. This means that farmers with higher incomes are more likely 
to join farmer based organizations (FBOs) than their counterpart with lower incomes. Joining 
FBOs comes with some financial commitments in the form of payment of dues, making of 
some contributions. Fulfilling these commitments is sometimes difficult for small scale 
farmers who cannot afford it. As a result, only those with higher incomes can afford to join 
the credit groups. This contradicts the findings from Kundu and Mitra (2006) who argued that 
increase in farm income reflects capacity to finance their own spending. Therefore as 
household income increase, the probability to borrow is expected to decrease hence the 
household do not participate any form of borrowing. However, when faced with credit 
constrain household with relatively higher farm income seek individual credit which has high 
credit limit as compared to the informal credit (Kundu and Mitra, 2006). 
 Loan interest rate (INTRSTRATE) was significant and negatively influenced 
households to join micro-credit groups with a marginal effect of 0.051. This means that an 
increase in loan interest rate by one percent decreases the probability of joining micro-credit 
group by 5.1 percent. This is because relatively lower interest rate reduces the total amount 
(principal plus interest) to be repaid and will not strain the borrower unlike when the interest 
rate is higher. On the contrary the finding of Gill (2003) and Rajeev et al. (2005) pointed out 
that participation to credit programme significantly increases as rate of interest increases. 
 Distance to the nearest financial institution from the borrowing household dwelling 
place (DSTNC) was significant and positively influenced individuals decision to join micro-
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credit group with a marginal effect of 0.018. An increase in distance to the nearest financial 
institution by one kilometer increases the probability of an individual joining micro-credit 
group by 1.8 percent. This is because long distances increase the travelling expenses in 
seeking for loans. Households are therefore better off joining credit groups since in these 
groups loan officers visit them at their meeting places cutting down on travelling expenses. 
This is consistent with the results of Doan et al. (2010) who found that household who are far 
away from the financial institution participated in credit schemes. Diverging from these 
findings Ayamagaet al. (2006) found out that a decrease in distance between MFI and 
borrowing households increases the chance of participating in micro-credit. Ayamaga et al., 
2006 argues that to the rural households, when the time and cost especially through travels is 
reduced by reduction in distance between credit institutions and rural borrowers dwelling 
place, then, the cost of credit is also reduced. 
4.2.2 Factors Affecting the Level of Micro-credit Group Participation 
     Table 7 shows Heckman two-step outcome equation results. Both household 
characteristics and social capital dimensions significantly affected level of participation in 
micro-credit groups. These include; Age, farm land size, years of experience in group 
borrowing, total household income, group heterogeneity, group decision making and density 
of membership. 
 Age of the borrower (AGE) was significant at 5 percent level and positively affected 
the household level of micro-credit group participation measured by number of borrowings 
within the credit group. This implies that ceteris paribus as the age of the group borrowers 
increase they gain more experience and expand in their business or farming activity. To 
finance their expanding activities the number of borrowings need to simultaneously increase 
since MFI loans have limits. This result concur with those found by Swain (2007) who stated 
that with the increase in age, accumulated experience, practical and professional wisdom of 
the household increased its income generating capability and demanded more credit to 
explore capabilities or to spend on consumption. 
Household farm size (FMSIZE) was found to be negatively significant at 10percent 
level in explaining the level of participation in micro-credit groups. This means that a unit 
increase in the farm size reduces the number of borrowings, with small farm size the 
household will be forced to borrow more in order to meet their basic needs. This can be done 
by increasing the rounds of borrowing rather than increasing the size of loan. This 
coroborates with Wanyama et al. (2006) findings that farm size significantly influences 
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farmers participation in loan taking such that the smaller the farm sizes the higher the 
likelihood of participating in loan taking. 
Table 7: Heckman Outcome Equation Results on the Determinants of Level of 
Participation in Micro-credit Groups in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya 
Dependent variable – Number of loan borrowings 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively 
 
Total household income (LnTTLINCM) given by the (sum of farm and off farm 
income) was significant at 1percent and positively at influenced household number of 
borrowings. An increase in total income increases the number of borrowings. As the total 
income increases the household gains confidence to increase the number of borrowings as 
they are assured of repaying it. The finding is consistent with the findings of Benito and 
Mumtaz (2006) that income levels influence households’ decisions to source microcredit 
either for investment or consumption purposes. 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
AGE  0.047 0.020  2.37 0.018** 
GENDER -0.241 0.034 -1.52 0.157 
HHSIZE  0.023 0.045  0.50 0.615 
EDUC   -0.005 0.026 -0.18 0.854 
LANDTNR -0.215 0.159 -1.35 0.177 
FMSIZE -0.134 0.072 -1.87 0.062* 
LnTTLINCM  0.694 0.147  4.72 0.000*** 
GRPSIZE -0.583 0.072 -3.67 0.247 
LnLNSIZE -0.242 0.184 -1.32 0.188 
INTRSTRATE  0.022 0.026  0.84 0.399 
EXPERNCE  0.310 0.077  4.04 0.000*** 
MTNGATNDCINDX  0.003 0.003  1.16 0.245 
HETEROINDX -0.007 0.003 -2.49 0.013** 
DECSNMKNGINDX  0.007 0.003  2.32 0.020** 
LnCASHCNTRBN -0.091 0.233 -0.39 0.695 
DSTYMBRSHP -0.375 0.103 -3.64 0.000*** 
_cons -4.248 2.885 -1.47 0.141 
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Experience in group borrowing (EXPERNCE) measured by the number of years one 
has been participating in the micro-credit group was significant at 1percent level with a 
positive coefficient. This implies that other things remaining constant an increase in the years 
experience in the micro-credit group increases the number of borrowings. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the member learns more about the mechanics of group borrowing 
scheme, group members and the MFI with increase in years of being a micro-credit group 
member. 
 Heterogeneity index (HETEROINDX) negative and significant at 5 percent level in 
influencing  the household level of micro-credit group participation. This means that a unit 
increase in group heterogeneity index (by 20 points) reduces the number of borrowings. The 
interpretation of this is that homogenous groups better understand themselves relative to 
heterogeneous groups since higher level of heterogeneity attracts conflict between members 
of the group (Yusuf, 2008). These results concur with the findings of Oladele and Olawuyi 
(2012) who found that heterogeneity index was significant and had a negative effect in 
improving household welfare in Oyo State, Nigeria. Similarly, (Okunmadewa et al., 2007) 
found that the likelihood of securing credit from local money lenders, friends, and family 
decreases as households become more diverse in South-Western States, Nigeria. However, 
Grootaert (1999) reported that internal heterogeneity of associations improved access to 
credit. 
 Decision making index (DECSNINDX) was positive and significantly affected the 
number of borrowings made by a group member at 5 percent level. This means that a unit 
increase in the level of decision making index increases the number of borrowings. This 
supports the findings of Tabi (2009) who found similar results while investigating the causal 
effect of Household social capital on labor force participation in Cameron. On the converse 
(Yusuf, 2008; Oladele and Olawuyi, 2012) found that active participation in decision making 
actually dampens welfare. Since high level of commitment to associations can reduce 
household welfare. 
 Density of membership (DSTYMBSHP) was found to be significant at 1percent level 
and negatively affected the number of borrowings made by the household. This means that an 
additional membership leads to a reduction in the number of borrowings. This is because 
members will commit more time and resources to increased number of groups affecting their 
productivity. This  may be lead sanction due to lack of adherence to the required regulations. 
This is in line with the findings of Okunmadewa et al. (2007) who found that an increase in 
density of membership index decreased the probability of obtaining credit from cooperative, 
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governmental agency and friends and family. In contrast, Mwangi  and Ouma (2012) found 
that the more the number of groups one subscribes to, the higher the probability of accessing 
an informal loan. 
4.3 Factors Influencing Household Loan Repayment Performance 
 Tobit regression analysis in Table 8 below was used to determine the factors that 
influence household loan repayment performance. The table shows that most of the 
coefficients are consistent with hypothesized relationships, and their tests of significance 
indicate their importance in explaining the repayment performance of borrowers in micro-
credit groups. The variables that were found to be significant in the model include; gender, 
household size, distance to the nearest MFI, experience in group borrowing, number of visits 
by loan officer, pressure in the group, density of membership, meeting attendance index and 
heterogeneity index. The P-values of these variables were significantly different from zero at 
the 0.1, 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance while the P-values of other variables were, 
however, not significant at these levels but were included based on the priori theoretical 
considerations. The positive signs of experience in group borrowing,number of visits by loan 
officer, peer pressure in the group, meeting attendance index and heterogeneity index implied 
that loan repayment capacity increased with increases in these variables. In the contrary, the 
negative sign of gender, household size, distance to the nearest financial institution and 
density of membership implied that repayment capacity decreased with an increase in the 
variable. 
 The gender (GENDER) of the household was significant at a P-value of 0.019. It 
however negatively influenced repayment performance. Whereas some studies support 
evidence to suggest a significant relationship between gender and repayment others have 
refuted it. The indicate that the probability of repayment by female is 10.7 percent more than 
their male counterparts in the micro-credit group. This finding confirms the argument of Dyar 
et al., 2006 and D'Espallier et al. (2009) who report that women are considered to be ideal 
credit targets because of their proven high loan repayment rates when compared to men. 
Sensitivity of women to peer-pressure and interventions of loan managers has been put 
forward by Rahman (2001) and Goetz and Gupta (1996) as one of the reasons for laudable 
women repayment records. This result contrasts the finding of Bhatt and Tang (2002) and 
Godquin (2004) who reported that men were most likely to repay than women. 
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Table 8: Tobit Regression Estimates of Social Capital Dimensions and other Factors 
Influencing Loan Repayment Performance in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya 
Marginal effects after Tobit 
      y = Pr (100<REPYMTRATE<0) (predict, pr (100,0)) 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
*, **, *** is significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively 
 The results revealed an existence of negative influence of household size (HHSIZE) 
on repayment performance implying that an increase in household size by one person 
decreases the repayment performance by 3.5 percent. This could have resulted from the fact 
that large household sizes increased the household head’s domestic obligations and thereby 
constituted divergence of the loan to household consumption stream and hence loan is not 
used for the intended purpose leading to low repayment performance. The result corroborated 
to those of Ugbomeh et al. (2008) who in their study of loan repayment performance among 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. Z P>|z| X 
AGE  0.003 0.006  0.450 0.651 39.517 
GENDER (*) -0.107 0.046 -2.340 0.019**   0.362 
HHSIZE -0.035 0.015 -2.330 0.020**   5.595 
EDUC -0.008 0.008 -1.060 0.289 10.172 
LnTTLINCM  0.017 0.052  0.330 0.738 11.619 
LANDTNR (*) -0.007 0.052 -0.140 0.890   0.638 
FMSIZE -0.018 0.025 -0.710 0.479   2.457 
DSTNC -0.005 0.003 -1.750 0.081* 20.440 
LnLNSIZE -0.012 0.064 -0.190 0.853 10.928 
INTRSTRATE  0.008 0.009  0.920 0.355 19.888 
GRPSIZE -0.013 0.011 -1.190 0.235 11.095 
EXPERNCE  0.067 0.028  2.430 0.015**   2.961 
VISITS  0.106 0.028  3.750 0.000***   2.474 
PEERPRSRE  0.061 0.033  1.820 0.068*   3.767 
LnCASHCNTRBN  0.070 0.079  0.890 0.376   7.101 
DSTYMBRSHP -0.096 0.036 -2.640 0.008***   1.879 
MTNGATNDCINDX  0.005 0.001  4.950 0.000*** 72.701 
HETEROINDX  0.003 0.001  2.840 0.004*** 60.172 
DECSNMKNGINDX  0.002 0.001  1.630 0.102 75.216 
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women self-help groups in Bayelsa State, Nigeria, found that household size impacted 
negatively on loan repayment performance of women farmers. To the contrary, Afolabi 
(2010) found a positive relationship between family size and loan repayment and attributed it 
to the respondents’ extensive utilization of family labour in the farming activities. 
 Experience in the micro-credit group (EXPERNCE) was found to be significant and 
positively influenced the repayment performance. This means that an increase in the years of 
experience by one year increase the repayment performance by 6.7 percent. This is 
interpreted that with increasing years of experience in the group group, members will 
understand each other in terms of economic abilities. The group which makes savings will 
have a large volume of savings which can be used to repay loans in case of  members’ 
default. Chirwa (1997) found no significant influence of club experience on credit repayment 
in assessing the determinants of the probability of credit repayment among smallholders in 
Malawi. 
 Distance to the nearest financial institution (DSTNC) was inversely related to loan 
repayment such that one kilometer increase in institution distance from the borrower will 
reduce the rate of microcredit repayment by 0.5 percent. The nearer a borrower is to a 
financial institution, the better was repayment performance. This is because individuals living 
close to the financial institution is accessible to the loan officer of the microfinance who will 
provide loan and business advice thereby improving the individual repayment performance. 
Closeness to the financial institution could also mean that the individual can repay the in 
small amounts without incurring extra cost of travelling. This result is in line with the 
findings of Oke et al., 2007 in Southwestern Nigeria. 
 Number of visits by the loan officer (VISITS) was significant and positively 
influenced the loan repayment performance.  An increase in the number of visits by one day 
increases the repayment performance by 10.6 percent. Increasing the number of loan officer 
visits could result in a well trained and motivated group that has low delinquency problems. 
This result corroborated with the results of Oke et al. (2007). 
 Peer pressure within the group (PEERPRSRE) is positively significant to the loan 
repayment performance. This implies that a positive increase in the level of group pressure 
increases the repayment performance by 6.1 percent. The fear of exclusion from the group 
induces the members to fulfill their obligations of repaying in time. Peer pressure also helps 
in enforcement of rules and regulations and smooth functioning of the group to meet its 
objectives. Since most MFIs allow the groups to self-select in their formation, the influence 
of peer pressure on group performance becomes a highly relevant issue. Similar results were 
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reported by Wenner (1995) who finds that screening and social pressure in group lending in 
Costa Rica help increase repayment capabilities of members of the group. Wenner asserts that 
in rural groups, the group’s willingness to exert peer pressure on defaulting members seems 
to be of primary importance in deterring moral hazard behavior. 
 Density of membership (DSTYMBSHP) was found to be significant and affected the 
repayment performance negatively. This imply that an additional membership is associated 
with a 0.96 percent decrease in repayment performance. Other things remaining constant as 
individuals increase the number of groups they have active participation, their commitment to 
the existing group will be compromised which in turn will affect their loan repayment 
performance. This result contrast with those of Grootaert et al. (1999) who showed that an 
additional membership in a group is associated with an increase in household expenditure per 
capita. 
 Meeting attendance index (MTNGATNDCINDX) was significant and positively 
influenced the loan repayment performance. This means all other factors remaining constant, 
a unit increase in the group meeting attendance index increased member loan repayment 
performance by 0.5 percent. As expected, these results indicate that groups whose members 
were more diligent in attending meetings perform better in loan repayment. This is probably 
because members who regularly attended their group meetings acquired better farming and 
business skills leading to higher productivity and hence improve their repayment 
performance. This could also be because micro-credi group fosters of commitment and trust. 
Manimekalai (2004) have validated the success of peer monitoring (as a proxy of frequency 
of meetings) to be a major factor that trigger better repayment performance. Similar results 
were reported by Wambugu et al. (2009) among Smallholder Producer Organizations in 
Western Kenya. However, Von (2004) found that the high frequency of meetings does not 
necessarily always lead to high level of mutual control. 
Heterogeneity index (HETEROINDX) of the group was also significant and 
influenced repayment performance positively. This implies that a unit increase in 
heterogeneity index (represented by 20 points) increases the repayment performance by 0.3 
percent. The reason to this could be when people from different age group, gender, education 
level, occupation and economic status come together they are able to help each other in time 
of need (for instance during seasons of poor harvest or when the businesses are making 
losses) to repay the borrowed loan hence improving repayment performance. This finding 
corroborates those of Wambugu et al. (2009) and Grootaert (2001) who found that among 
social capital dimensions, heterogeneity of a group has a positive impact on organization 
48 
 
level of commercialization and household welfare respectively. Correspondingly, evidence 
from Bangladesh and Madagascar suggests that economic heterogeneity in the group 
(especially different income sources) improves repayment rates because of the group’s better 
ability to pool risk (Sharma and Zeller, 1997). The finding however contradicts those of 
Nagarajan et al. (1999) who find that homogenous groups perform better. They argue that 
membership homogeneity reduces information problems and ensures members have common 
interest. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
The principal objective of this study was to assess the influence of social capital 
dimensions and other factors in improving low income households’ credit access and 
repayment performance in micro-credit groups in Uasin Gishu County. More specifically, the 
study was designed to identify the variables, which influence households to participate/join 
micro-credit group and find out how social capital dimensions affect the level of micro-credit 
group participation (measured by number of borrowings) and group loan repayment 
performance. This study found that group borrowing is gaining ground as a tool for enabling 
households who lack collaterals to access financial capital Moiben division. This emphasizes 
the role social capital within micro-credit groups could play if harnessed to alleviate lack of 
credit in rural areas in a country where almost half of the rural population lack accesses to 
financial capital. Despite the availability of micro-credit groups in Moiben division, the 
number of borrowings that have been made by group members and the loan repayment 
performance are still low. 
Specifically, findings of the study revealed significant difference in age, farm size, 
years education, household income, loan size, distance to the nearest financial institution and 
interest rate between the group borrowers and individual borrowers. As hypothesized, the 
results show that social capital dimensions and household socio-economic characteristics 
affects how well a micro-credit group performs both on the number of loans borrowed and 
group loan repayment performance. In particular, the results indicated that household size, 
farm income and distance to the nearest financial institution positively influenced a 
household to join micro-credit group. An increase in any of these factors motivates 
households to join micro-credit group while a decrease discourages. Age, gender, years of 
education, farm size and interest rate on the other hand negatively influenced household 
decision to join micro-credit groups implying that an increase in any of these variables 
dampens household participation. The level of household participation in micro-credit groups 
was positively influenced by age, total income, years of experience in group borrowing and 
decision making index while farm size, heterogeneity index and density of membership had a 
negative impact on household participation. Group loan repayment performance was 
positively influenced by experience in group borrowing, number of visits by loan officer, 
peer pressure, meeting attendance index and heterogeneity index while gender, household 
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size, distance to the nearest financial institution and density of membership had a negative 
effect household loan repayment performance. Attention must therefore be given to the group 
internal factors and other factors, in the design of development strategies that target the poor 
households’ access to credit and repayment performance through micro-credit groups. The 
study concludes that social capital dimensions are crucial if group lending has to grow to 
reach a large proportion of the rural inhabitants and improve loan repayment performance. 
5.3 Recommendations 
Alternatives to bank credit have been used to manage the problem of lack of credit. 
Group lending is one of them and is rapidly expanding globally offering an attractive credit 
access opportunity for the low income households in developing countries. The study has 
drawn attention to information that can guide policy towards influencing micro-credit group 
participation in recognition of its potential benefits. Therefore, the study has made the 
following recommendations. Group lending through micro-credit groups has the potential to 
be increase low income household access to credit and improve their loan repayment 
performance. This imply that governments, MFIs, NGOs and other lending organizations 
should take a pro-active role in organizing and facilitating the formation of micro-credit 
groups and linking them to loans. In addition, the government should encourage micro-credit 
group formation by eliminating or reducing some of the legislation requirements that are 
often prohibitive in the formation of such groups. Attention should also focus on younger 
households and those with lower level of education since they were willing to join and 
actively participate in group borrowing and. The government should also ensure that 
households have security of tenure through provision of title deeds to create an incentive for 
individual borrowing where households are reluctant to join micro-credit groups. Lastly, the 
government should improve road and market infrastructure in the rural areas to attract private 
investors and financial institutions this will bring lending institutions closer to the rural 
households. 
5.4 Areas of Further Research 
The current study was carried out in Moiben Division, Uasin Gishu County, Kenya 
which is a small geographical area. Further research should be carried out on a wider scale to 
determine the importance of social capital dimensions on household access to credit and 
repayment performance in order to provide results that can be generalised and give accurate 
policy recommendations. It could also be interesting to incorporate data on rural-urban 
dichotomy which will bring out more salient issues on the different effects of social capital 
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dimensions in the two distinct locations. In addition, the effects of growing technological 
advancement in loan repayment such as money transfer services need to be evaluated. 
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